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HLEFBy JARED KNOLL

Cullen Hendrix and Henk-Jan Brinkman authored a candid but comprehensive report in September 2012 for the HLEF forum on Food Insecurity in Protracted Crisis, to compel greater focus on the interdependent forces of food insecurity, violence, and genocidal processes. Last month, they expanded their findings and published them in a revised paper, Food Insecurity and Conflict Dynamics: Causal Linkages and Complex Feedbacks, in which they focus on salient and emerging cases in the Sahel region of Africa. The questions which need considering are, “What lineages exist between food insecurity and conflict?”, “What role can food security interventions play?”, and How can food security-related international policies be crafted in such a way to prevent genocidal processes?” The authors argue for the possibility of responsible interventions and effective policy to transform violence and insecurity into stability and peace, given the international community’s willingness and commitment to encouraging peacebuilding with mindfulness to food security.

Food insecurity, violent conflict, and genocidal processes are interconnected and each support and exacerbate the others, the report argues, with conflict itself being a cause of food insecurity, and food insecurity potentially causing and increasing conflict. The real complexity comes into play when, in some cases, a food security intervention can resolve and even transform conflict by alleviating grievances and desperation, but in other cases it can escalate the violent efforts of a rebellion that would otherwise have insufficient resources to wage war.

  • Chronic food insecurity: a persistent lack of food, either due to empty markets, or food prices too high for a population to afford it. Can lead to grievances against the state, which may lead to rebellion and open conflict.
  • Acute food insecurity: sudden lack of food, such as from a draught or crop failure. Can be a direct cause of rebellion, especially when scarce resources are distributed unfairly, but can also reduce a dissatisfied population’s capacity to rebel if militants cannot maintain logistics.
  • Strategic denial: deliberate disruption or blockade of food, either from local sources or foreign aid. The report focuses on the case of South Kourdofan as an example, where two years ago the Sudanese army closed off the World Food Programme’s stockpiles, and somewhere between 100,000 and 200,000 refugees were displaced to surrounding states.

These variances each require an entirely different approach; the report urges that interventions may have positive or negative impacts in each circumstance, depending on steps taken. Any policy-based solution is further stymied by the type of conflict. In a communal conflict with acute food insecurity, an intervention may be likely to transform the conflict, but in a civil one it can reescalate. In chronic situations, the opposite results can be true. Intervening in food prices can have a very different effect if the state in crisis is democratic, or non-democratic. This is all before taking into consideration cultural, historical and sociopolitical factors specific to a region.

Recommendations to “The International Community” for Peacebuilding and Prevention

  1. Act as a third party to negotiations, encouraging inclusive political processes and DDR.
  2. Ensure food security interventions address issues of inequality on as permanent a basis as possible, through measures such as school feeding programmes and agricultural extension services.
  3. Support development capacities and public administration systems by empowering access to social services in vulnerable communities.
  4. Take an outcome-centric approach with safety net systems, like food-for-work programmes, that focus on (re)building infrastructure and improving sustainable livelihoods.
  5. Aim to improve social cohesion by working closely with communities and encouraging participatory programmes, which can help reintegrate IDPs.

The Hendrix-Brinkman report and subsequent publication may not be breaking new ground or providing revelation, but it achieved what it’s meant to – comprehensively break down a highly complex set of factors contributing to violence conflict and genocidal processes, and make a call to policymakers in the international community to integrate a food insecurity lens. The authors’ recommendations aren’t complex or revolutionary – their stark simplicity should be a challenge for all members of the international community to turn knowledge into action.

Photo: fao.org

This past February, the Auschwitz Institute awarded the Raphael Lemkin prize to Dr. Barbara Harff, to recognize her contributions to the field of genocide prevention. Dr. Harff agreed to discuss via print correspondence some of her thoughts and positions on subjects related to the state of genocide prevention today, her past and current work, involvement with the Institute, and thoughts toward the future.
 
Dr. Harff is Professor of Political Science Emerita at the US Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland, and has twice been a distinguished visiting professor at the Strassler Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies. She is a prolific author, whose work has been important for the crafting of genocide prevention policy, as well as academics. She co-coined the useful term ‘politicide,’ and her early warning framework for genocide prevention has been a critical component of many projects and programs.

Much of your work has focused on ethnic aspects of conflicts, genocides and politicides… do you feel the role of this sort of lens has changed since you started out in the field? Do you see or foresee any potential challenges or problems in the way of this approach?

I co-authored a book on ethnic conflict and suggested that these types of conflicts have the potential to escalate into genocide (as in Rwanda), but so do other conflicts such as revolutions (see Cambodia) and adverse regime change (such as in Chile, which turned into a politicide). During the late 70’s and early 80’s, most genocide scholars (meaning all approx. 10 of us) thought that any combinations or a single  factor such as ethnicity, race, or religion were a necessary condition in most genocidal situations, given the wording of the Convention.  However, when I began collecting information on the 46 cases that eventually became the data set used by State Failure (now Political Instability Task Force), it became apparent that victims sometimes were members of mixed ethnic groups and that perpetrators targeted them because they belonged to political opposition groups. Cambodia was a classic example, where most victims and perpetrators were ethnic Khmers — only a minority of victims belonged to different ethnicities, such as the Chams, Vietnamese, and Chinese. Cambodia was a reason that I coined the term politicide, which suggests that victims not only could be members of multiple identity groups but were primarily targeted because of their political affiliation. Of the 46 cases that I identified post WWII, many are mixed cases. For example, the Kurds in Iraq and indigenous Maya that supported  the left in Guatemala.

Your work has been seminal, influencing an indeterminably wide swath of policy and scholarship… have you been particularly disappointed with any of the frameworks, policies, or concepts that have been built upon your ideas?

There are other scholars who have contributed more. I am especially thinking of my friend and mentor Helen Fein, the late Leo KuperFrank Chalk, and others. We have listened to each other, critiqued, cited, and supported one another’s efforts. We have built a discipline and it is now possible to get jobs in good universities, which was not a necessary truth in the 1980’s. As a Northwestern PhD, (according to my professors) I should have been at a major research university but the most frequently asked question at the time during interviews was, “What is that stuff you are doing?”.

How could I be disappointed? Systematic analysis is flourishing in Australia, Canada, Britain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the US—the Albright/Cohen report mentions my risk assessment and early warning efforts as something that needs doing and risk assessment is done routinely not just by me but in the US government and others. The UN (I had provided them with a framework and regular risk assessments) is a bit behind despite their talented personnel. That probably has much to do with antiquated opinions about quantitative analysis, as well as politically motivated leadership in related UN offices. When Juan Mendez became Adviser to the UN, he and his two associates visited me at my home in Annapolis to see how we could work together. I am not just a number cruncher but also a case study person and a specialist on the Middle East. Moreover, having been born into a leftist German family, I am also quite familiar about European affairs. A genocide scholar is/should not be bounded by either discipline or approach. My dissertation focused on prevention using legal philosophical arguments, but grounded in international law, and it also included an empirical exercise in which I tested empathy in different societies using fictional scenarios that had a historical base.

My/our work has caught on beyond expectations. Genocide is a household word — we have seen action in many situations and the recognition that systematic risk assessment and early warning are ever more needed is apparent. Aside from an African initiative, other governments have proceeded to establish their own centers. Why not indeed emulate the hard sciences instead of dabbling in case study-based analysis of specific situations? We do it globally based on accepted wisdom regarding dozens of cases. It is not too hard to generate good data, develop hypotheses based on theory, and then test assumptions. We/I have tested dozens of variables (including economic and environmental variables) that purport to support escalation to genocide. In addition, I developed a complex early warning model that used dynamic factors to track that evolution. For example, we tracked hate propaganda, small arms deliveries, etc. on a daily basis.

Your term and idea of politicide has not caught on as much as it perhaps could have in the international community. Are policymakers and scholars hamstringing themselves from potentially greater efficacy by not considering the targeting of political groups as a more important factor? Where would you like to see this focus brought to bear in today’s climate of conflict?

Why is there not more international action? Because, to use my old mantra, we do not know what remedies that tap state capacity and interest work in what situations at what time. What worked in Macedonia does not work in Syria. I made that argument many times and have developed response scenarios based on my early warning analysis, but much work remains. Just think of Burma—in the past, it was one of the worst case scenarios. I had argued for lifting sanctions to incorporate that country into the international community of states. There was a huge black market, and sanctions did not work—they more often make it harder for the already poor—and the West had zero influence but ASEAN, China, and Japan did—things are getting better.

Are you optimistic that the genocidal trends you’ve studied for three decades are diminishing? Can you realistically envision a world where we have early warning systems adequate to the task of completely circumventing mass atrocities?

For the time being, the occurrence of genocides are diminishing. But over the long run, I am pessimistic.  The West may have a learned a few more lessons after Bosnia but Africans will be challenged by Muslim radicals—see Mali, Northern Nigeria, the 10th century maps of Islamic expansion. I am deeply disturbed by the emergence of right-wing movements in Europe that occasionally spout anti-Jewish rhetoric. In addition, there are indigenous peoples still under threat of annihilation, ethnic cleansing, and extreme discrimination, such as the indigenous peoples of West Papua.

What role do area experts have to play?

Experts need to both show compassion and distance themselves from quick judgment. Most of us are driven by a belief and desire that it is possible to build a better world, based on mutual respect and tolerance. However, given the unequal  distribution of resources, lack of access to education, and re-emerging  medieval  ideas about how women should be treated, I am a profound pessimist. Especially disturbing for me is re-emerging anti-semitism in its most primitive form (blood libel, the Protocol of the Elders of Zion, etc).  Are we regressing to superstitions and the caveman mentality that drove Nazis? I see a dangerous trend evolving in the Muslim world—tribalism, sectarianism, radical forms of Islam (Salafis), indoctrination of their unemployed and undereducated youth. Where will it lead?

Regarding Syria, is there an onus on Western actors to intervene, or otherwise impact the conflict? What sorts of missteps are we in danger of making?

It made my list of extremely high-risk cases before the outbreak of violence. The UN was informed—we had pictures of mines on the border with Turkey—their aim was to maim refugees. But the West is tired and sees the Middle East as a cauldron of  ever re-emerging conflicts. There is a real lack of enlightened leadership. You cannot build democracies by relying on networks of families, clans, tribes, sectarian and/or religious loyalties. We have always underestimated the strength of these ties. Countries running out of energy, water, having extended droughts and exploding birthrates are endangered to descend into chaos. Of the few that have functional educational systems, meaning they educate their young in the sciences, there are no opportunities. Maybe these countries have to go through these convulsions to find their way into the modern world. It is possible that Yemen, the poorest and most vulnerable (running out of water), has a chance of success through inter-tribal dialogue that includes women to build a stable autocracy or semi-democracy. Syria as of now may divide into Sunni, Alawite, and Kurdish regions under the influence of Iran/Russia/Saudi Arabia, and/or aligned with Salafis in Egypt. Of course, this is speculation.

How did you come to be involved with the Auschwitz Institute? Has your time as an instructor impacted any aspects of your scholarship or views?

What AIPR does is laudable, to put it mildly. As to my two lectures and one interview, the interview went well but the Jagiellonian University’s information system had too few subscribers. One lecture went well; the other, nowhere.  I expected the participants to read and they did not. Well, a lesson learned—start on a more basic level. My suggestion is to be bold—challenge re-emerging anti-semitism wherever you find it. Some of our young hosts (Jewish students from Poland)  told me that they keep a low profile—it deeply upset me. And then there is Auschwitz—as a German born non-Jewish scholar, it provides all the answers about why I am doing this kind of work—but this place is hell on earth and am I bothered that some visitors show a lack of respect when they walk over one of the largest cemeteries on earth.

Bosnian women stage protestBy SAMANTHA LAKIN*

Impunity Watch: Cases of Gender and Post-Conflict Transitional Justice

This is a call to policymakers, who work to formulate policy to prevent the recurrence of genocide. How do we give a voice to survivors? How do we pay appropriate attention to victims of gender-based violence (GBV), as specific crimes, that can be a tool of genocide?  Impunity Watch’s report, “Giving a voice to victims: Towards gender-sensitive processes of TJRNR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi and Guatemala” attempts to answer these significant questions. The main goal of the report is to provide analysis and recommendations for policymakers to reach gender-sensitive goals in rebuilding plans, to prevent future incidences of genocidal violence.

Impunity Watch, an organization promoting accountability for past international atrocities in violent, conflict-affected countries, released a series of reports on December 18, 2012 about transitional justice and gender. The reports provide an in-depth look at justice, peace, and truth-telling processes in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), Burundi, and Guatemala.

Why a Gendered Analysis?

Gender analysis has become increasingly significant when determining the ways in which conflict and rebuilding processes affect men and women. As notable scholars from The Feinstein International Center at Tufts University have recently reported, separating gender from significant fields, including international development, conflict management, humanitarian response, or policy-making, is neither feasible nor desirable, and will lead to incomplete conclusions about the effects of policymakers’ actions and impact.[i]  The Impunity Watch reports aim to understand how gender, transitional justice, atrocities prevention, and post-conflict policies have been addressed in these three cases, providing both strengths and shortcomings.

This article will address the policies and recommendations (some new, some restated yet important) in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and how the main stakeholders could “do better” to address women’s rights in the aftermath of conflict. In this first article, I will discuss the main findings and challenges in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina. My next two articles will address the Impunity Watch reports on Burundi and Guatemala.

Gender-Sensitive Processes in Bosnia-Herzegovina

The 94-page report summarizes the main obstacles to promoting gender-sensitive peace, reconciliation, and non-recurrence. Frankly, it is more difficult for women to have access to, participate in, and benefit from processes of truth, justice, reparations and non-recurrence (TJRNR), since these do not take the needs of women into consideration in design or implementation. For example, a female internally displaced person (IDP) reclaiming property will often encounter prejudices and a lack of understanding within society, something a male IDP will likely not experience. Women looking for their missing husbands are not entitled to certain benefits from the Law on Missing Persons. Victims of wartime sexual violence (which are mainly women in BiH, though not exclusively) face major challenges in obtaining war-related compensation. In short, there is a clear need to integrate a gender-sensitive approach to processes of TJRNR, to better include both female and male victims. This will help transform the broader social context of trauma and post-conflict experiences and development.[ii]

Some positive progress has been made to advance gender-sensitive justice in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Currently, the Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees (MHRR) is steering the process of drafting a document entitled Program of Assistance to Women Victims of War Rape, Sexual Violence and Torture 2013-2016. This plan will also include male victims of wartime sexual violence.[iii]

Gender analysis can highlight how gender-based violence, including rape, forced prostitution, and enforced pregnancy, can be used as weapons of genocide; this is a new understanding  in legal practice and policy. In the case of Bosnia, for example, forced pregnancy was used to try and create more ethnically desirable babies, thus further driving out minority communities. This link between GBV and genocide is a clear call to action for policy makers to pay attention to GBV as an instrument of genocide.

How Conflict in BiH Disparately Affected Women

The conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which lasted from 1992 until the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995, was between the region’s population of three ethnic groups, or ‘constituent peoples’: Bosniaks (48%), Serbs (37.1%), and Croats (14.3%).[iv] For more than 40 years the region was a federation of six republics: Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Slovenia, as well as two autonomous provinces: Vojvodina and Kosovo. In 1987, Slobodan Milošević came to power in Serbia, vividly encouraging Serbian nationalism and nurturing the idea of Greater Serbia. Based on this ideal, fighting ensued and a number of massacres took place, which led to an international crisis, including the use of war tactics and mass violence to drive out minority populations. After the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords negotiated an end to the conflict, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established in 1996, to establish justice for the region, and ideally to promote a lasting peace. A number of perpetrators indicted by the ICTY were charged with crimes of genocide.

In Srebrenica, one of the most well-known massacres of the war, the men were separated from the women and killed systematically, which left psychological, legal, economic, and social difficulties for the women survivors. More research has been done on the massacre at Srebrenica and the gendered pattern of violence there.

Shortcomings of the Process in BiH

  1. In the processes related to truth, women’s participation so far has been limited.
  2. When it comes to guarantees of non-recurrence, it appears that a rather one-sided picture after the conflict in BiH has been created, whereby women are mostly seen as victims of the war, while men are mostly seen as heroes.
  3. While women make up one half of the Expert Working Group that drafted the Transitional Justice Strategy, and the president of the EWG is a woman, judging from the first draft of the TJS, there is room for improvement regarding the issue of gender-sensitivity. Sexual violence was widely excluded in the document, and a more widespread support from civil society organizations (CSOs) was lacking.

Recommendations for Rebuilding and Non-Recurrence

Key recommendations highlight where the process in BiH can go to improve gender sensitivity and the rights and status of women. The recommendations also show the link between GBV and genocide. Some recommendations are as basic as institutional reform, and ensuring that institutions include an integrated gender-sensitive perspective in their research and recommendations. Gender/sex disaggregated data is also needed, especially with regard to crimes of sexual violence. [v]

New recommendations, specific to BiH, are noteworthy, and can serve as examples for other post-conflict cases looking to address the same issues of gender and transitional justice. These cover four main categories of change:

  1. Technical changes, including the male/female composition of committees, political appointments, etc. I would also suggest more data collection and dissemination of data about atrocities, to better understand and analyze the gendered effects of the conflict.
  2. Legal changes, including women’s access to reparations (a large section on this topic in the report concludes that women hit many barriers when claiming reparations for crimes committed during the conflict, and often fall through the cracks of what crimes are legally recognized).
  3. Societal changes, including making processes more accessible and open to women, providing economic opportunities to women in the post-conflict economy, and continuing to provide funding and support for the implementation of the National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325.
  4. Structural changes, including encouraging participation by women and civil society in relevant TJRNR processes, particularly those related to integrating a gender-sensitive approach in the latter (such as the Program for Assistance to Women Victims of War Rape, Other Forms of Sexual Violence and Torture 2013-2016); creating a space for women to testify to the ICTY and to tell their stories.

The Impunity Watch report outlines a holistic transitional justice strategy to address gender-sensitive rebuilding and links to prevention of mass atrocities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Empowering women and changing the narrative of women solely as victims, while recognizing the reality of gender-based crimes as planned tools of genocide (see the work of Hugo Slim, Cynthia Enloe, and Ximena Bunster), can allow policymakers to pay attention to gendered aspects of conflict, rebuilding, and non-recurrence.

Photo: guardian.co.uk


*Samantha Lakin is currently earning her M.A. in Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University’s Fletcher School.
[i] Dyan Mazurana, Prisca Benelli, Huma Gupta, Peter Walker, The Feinstein International Center, Tufts University
[ii] Maja Šoštarić, “Perspectives Series: Research Report, War Victims and Gender-Sensitive Truth, Justice, Reparations, and Non-Recurrence in Bosnia and Herzegovina” Impunity Watch, December 2012, 9.
[iii] Ibid 8
[iv] Ibid 21
[v] Ibid 76-83

 

By MARISSA GOLDFADEN

On January 25, 2013, Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health, in conjunction with the Women’s Media Center’s Women Under Siege project, hosted a symposium, “Global Sexualized Violence: From Epidemiology to Action.” The focus of this post is on a panel discussing law, policy, and action on global sexualized violence.

Cristina Finch, policy and advocacy director for women’s human rights for Amnesty International USA, opened the panel, citing a UN statistic that 1 in 3 women will suffer some form of violence in their lifetime. Finch believes this to be a conservative estimate. She discussed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and how it can be used to protect women against rape as a weapon of war, honor killings, and domestic abuse. She also pointed to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) as further providing a road map for eradicating such abuses, though the United States is one of seven countries that has yet to ratify it. Finch also highlighted United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, which ultimately established the Interagency Taskforce on Women, Peace and Security. She closed her allotted time by talking about the need to reauthorize the Violence Against Women Act, which the U.S. Senate will vote on next week.

The next speaker was epidemiologist Les Roberts, who spoke about how public health feeds into the intersection of law and policy when it comes to sexual violence. Aside from the fact that there is often a lack of information sharing, public health also approaches the subject differently. One way it does so is to provide confidentiality to victims and, in a related manner, handles these matters with sensitivity, whereas a legal approach is necessarily concerned with specificity. Further, in regards to GBV, public health programming is at odds with rights-based frameworking, as Finch spoke about.

Next on the agenda was the Global Justice Center‘s Akila Radhakrishnan, an attorney working on the Geneva Initiative, “which aims to ensure justice, accountability and equal rights to people in conflict and in post-conflict situations, and establish global legal precedents protecting human rights and ensuring gender equality.” A gender lens is not typically applied to international law or the laws of war, but progress was made with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in that rape and gender-based violence were officially recognized as being a systematic part of conflict–rape can be considered torture, a war crime, a crime against humanity, and a way to perpetrate genocide. This is codified in the Rome Statute, the treaty that established the International Criminal Court.

The last person to speak before the Q&A session was Meghan Donahue, gender and education coordinator of the Peace Corps. Her professional goal is to “help people develop the capacity to use their own resources and skills to resolve their needs and improve their own lives.” When her volunteers are dispatched, they teach local children about the social constructs of gender. They believe in a people-centered approach, focusing on sustainable development, community mapping, and student-friendly schools. The Peace Corps volunteers also seek to facilitate enabling environments, and help break down gender attitudes and cycles of poverty.

Lastly, moderator Lauren Wolfe asked the panelists a handful of questions before opening up the floor to the audience. When asked about how to put an end to global sexualized violence, the participants stated that we must get rid of misogyny, be honest about risk factors and data, and enforce existing laws. There also needs to be a combination of top-down laws and bottom-up community action/advocacy. Donahue pointed out that this recipe is what led to the disavowal of female genital mutilation in Senegal. Finally, when it comes to sexual violence, focus needs to shift from the victim to the perpetrator.

By MARISSA GOLDFADEN

disarmamentIn November 2012, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs released a publication, Civil Society and Disarmament 2012 – Applying a Disarmament Lens to Gender, Human Rights, Development, Security, Education and Communication: Six Essays. Given the Auschwitz Institute’s mission, this post focuses on the essay, “Minimizing the impact of illicit small arms and diverted weapons transfers in the commission of atrocity crimes, human rights violations and other violence” by Hector Guerra of International Action Network on Small Arms and Robert Zuber of Global Action to Prevent War and Armed Conflict.

This piece centers on illicit small arms and the ways in which they contribute to mass atrocity crimes and community violence throughout the world. One statistic states that “of the 740,000 people who die each year as a result of armed violence, 500,000 are fatalities related to situations of violence other than armed conflicts, fatalities largely related to the use of small arms and light weapons.” The United Nations has endeavored to solve the problem of illicit weapons via various programs and protocols; this past summer, an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) was negotiated. However, agreement on a final text was elusive and a new meeting will take place in March 2013.

According to the authors, “the irresponsible transfer of weapons and ammunition and the proliferation of illicit small arms have direct implications for our ability to secure our streets, deliver aid to unstable areas, prevent abuses of human rights and the commission of mass atrocities, and create environments conducive to full political and policy participation by women and cultural minorities.” Many ‘illicit’ weapons originate in the legal sector before moving through unregulated transfers into the wrong hands. The uses of such weapons have far-reaching dangerous impacts, including:

  • Illicit arms perpetuate conflicts that could otherwise be resolved.
  • Illicit arms undermine development and inhibit the flow of assistance to internally displaced persons, refugees, and others in dire need.
  • Illicit arms in the hands of both State and non-State actors have been used to violate civilian populations’ human rights and impede efforts to bring perpetrators to justice. 
  • Illicit arms and ammunition hinder the ability of governments to carry out some of their most important functions, including the primary responsibility to protect civilians from violence.
  • Illicit arms “undermine the integrity of the security sector, creating or exacerbating levels of unacceptable risk for women and others seeking their proper place in society.”
  • Illicit arms “contribute to cycles of violence and criminality that reinforce structures of poverty as women and men continue to expend large amounts of energy on security needs that could more beneficially be spent on pursuing educational and economic opportunity.”

All of the above is in addition to the immeasurable physical and psychological damage suffered by civilians as a result of illicit weapons access by criminals, insurgents, or other non-State actors. One of the most serious aspects of the proliferation of illicit weapons is “related to the role those weapons play in the commission of mass violence, including the shootings at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado in 1999 and the massacre at Utoya, Norway in 2011.”

The UN has had the prevention of mass violence, both at the community level and within broader international legal frameworks, at the forefront of its agenda since its inception. Urgency in this area escalated in 2005 with the advent of the Responsibility to Protect norm. This is because the illicit trade in conventional weapons and ammunition severely complicates efforts to build State capacity and otherwise help governments fulfill their primary responsibility to protect their civilian populations. Moreover, their are staggering costs to fragile States from mass atrocity and other conflicts fueled in part by illicit weapons. For example, Africa loses ~$18 billion per year due to wars, civil wars, and insurgencies. Conservatively, armed conflict shrinks an African nation’s economy by 15%. 

In order to combat the multitude of problems outlined above, governments, civil society organizations, and other stakeholders must work together. Concrete steps include:

  • Exploring local and regional linkages between the presence of illicit arms and the threat of mass violence/human rights abuses.
  • Calling attention to and addressing the linkages between legal arms sales diverted to non-State actors and criminal elements, and “the commission of human rights abuses, the suppression of access to jobs and services, and the chilling impacts of a compromised security sector on women’s participation in political and social life.”
  • “Assist States, especially fragile States, to guarantee the security of existing weapons stockpiles (or remove them altogether), and help ensure marking, tracing and record keeping of arms that is cost-effective and sufficiently interactive with the highest international standards in this area.”
  • Restricting the illicit flow/diversion of ammunition for small arms.
  • Assisting States in promoting citizen disarmament.
  • Assisting States in implementing important responsibilities resulting from the illicit arms trade, e.g., provide victims’ assistance and flag potentially diverted transfers.

Other resources include the UN’s recently revised Disarmament: A Basic Guide, and voices from impacted communities.

Photo: un.org

By MARISSA GOLDFADEN

The Genocide Prevention Advisory Network recently issued a conference report from their advanced workshop at The Hague on March 14-15, 2012. Focusing on the emerging global and regional architectures aiming at the prevention of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, the conference addressed the following questions:

  • What guiding principles are emerging to shape the architecture and community of genocide prevention and its relevant fields?
  • What can GPANet offer to articulate those principles and strengthen these emerging capacities?
  • How can GPANet work in partnership to support and facilitate local, national, regional and international prevention networks?

The papers presented at the conference dealt with the topics of early warning and data gathering and verification systems, case studies on Somalia, linkages with terrorism, and lastly, perspectives on genocide prevention. This final subject is what we’ll focus on, given the work of AIPR.

Discussing Holocaust education and genocide prevention, Yehuda Bauer spoke of the “problematic” text of the Genocide Convention and the resultant inefficacy of the United Nations to prevent or halt instances of genocide post-World War II: two examples being Rwanda in 1994 and Sudan at present. Given the structure of the Security Council, geopolitical interests often trump those of the humanitarian variety. Moreover, Bauer argues that race and ethnicity are modern social constructs, given the singular origin of the human species. This leads to the common “us vs. them” framing that serves to precipitate genocide. All of this is compounded by the fact that, “There is a dialectical development one can discern in international politics, reflecting two contradictory global trends: a tendency towards greater unification on the one hand, and an opposing tendency towards greater autonomy and independence of ethnic and/or national groups on the other hand.”

Gregory Stanton, president of Genocide Watch and formulator of the Eight Stages of Genocide model, noted Genocide Watch’s early warning system and how “[r]apid response by regional alliances has prevented or stopped several genocides: in East Timor, Kosovo, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia , and Sierra Leone.” He also spoke of the success of international tribunals and the creation of the ICC. Having worked against genocide for 30 years, Stanton says he has learned two things about genocide prevention. He states:

  1. The first lesson is the direct result of our own human incapacity to comprehend or feel sympathy for large groups of people halfway around the world. Because individuals cannot do that, we need permanent institutions established that will watch out for precursors of genocide, take action to prevent it, intervene to stop it, and arrest and prosecute those who commit it.
  2. The second lesson I have learned is that genocide prevention must start and be led by people from countries at risk. It cannot be led by an American organization in Washington, DC, led by a pacifist director, that is unwilling to advocate the use of force to stop genocide. Prevention must especially begin from the ground up in countries at risk of genocide. A true International Alliance to End Genocide can support such local efforts and create an international mass movement to end genocide.

Daniel Feierstein then offered “A Critique of the Hegemonic View of the Current Genocidal Conflicts: A Perspective from the Latin American Margin.” His understanding of genocide seeks to dismantle a simplistic “Good People vs. Bad People” scenario and instead puts forth a perspective where genocide is “a technology of power used very successfully to destroy and reorganize social relationships and identities.” He believes “this would be a better explanation of why it continues beyond our collective calls of ‘never again.'” He went on to point out three different initiatives as possible alternatives to the military intervention model:

1. The UNASUR (Union of South American Nations) Experience

Since the UNASUR Constitutive Treaty was signed on May 23, 2008, UNASUR has helped four countries in the region that have experienced the possibility of new violent conflicts: Bolivia (2008), Honduras (2009), Ecuador (2010), and the conflict between Colombia and Venezuela (2010). In each case there was a major crisis with strong potential to trigger atrocity crimes.

2. The Regional Fora on Genocide Prevention

Writes Feierstein, “The idea was to meet all the governments of a region to create an open exchange and debate on how to prevent possible genocidal conflicts. As every government is involved in the discussions, there is a possibility (only a possibility, but we should have little utopias, which are more possible to achieve than the big ones) that the real problems of the regions will appear. It is even possible that some approaches to resolve them will emerge, as there are few instances in which the governments are invited to debate on regional perspectives to analyze and prevent genocide.”

3. The Auschwitz Institute for Peace and Reconciliation

AIPR has organized several meetings with mid- and low-level representatives, with the idea that governments change but there are some kinds of officers who continue in their key positions as professionals and/or bureaucracy. The objective of the AIPR is to train those people in early warning and genocide prevention as a challenge for the future.

The  workshop concluded with a concept note by Alice Ackermann on emerging genocide prevention structures in Europe and Liberata Mulamula discussing the same in the context of the Great Lakes region of Africa.

By MARISSA GOLDFADEN

Last week, Alex Bellamy, who writes regularly on issues of responsibility to protect, authored a blog post (on a relatively new blog, Protection Gateway) entitled, Stopping genocide and mass atrocities–the problem of regime change. He opens by positing the question, “Should international action to protect people from genocide and mass atrocities ever result in regime change?” before laying out five potential checks to guard against governments justifying armed intervention to pursue their own self interests via regime change “whilst recognising  that regime change may sometimes be necessary to save lives.”:

  1. Intervention must have a mandate from the United Nations Security Council.
  2. States that champion intervention should be expected to demonstrate their humanitarian intent by acknowledging – through their words and deeds – a duty to prevent genocide and mass atrocities and respond in the most effective ways possible.
  3. The third test relates to the use of humanitarian justifications and their relationship to the known facts of the case. The simplest test of an actor’s intention is to compare what they say they are doing with what is known about the case.
  4. The calibration of means and ends. Would-be interveners should select strategies that enable them to prevail without undermining humanitarian outcomes.
  5. States that intervene in the affairs of others ought to recognise a duty to help the country rebuild its infrastructure, restore its autonomy, and re-establish its self-determination.

While much discussion, debate, and reporting currently focuses on the third pillar of R2P and conflates this with military intervention, the fact is that under R2P, the international community has three main responsibilities: the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react, and the responsibility to rebuild. In a sense, the fifth check is a reformulation of these responsibilities. Bellamy writes that interventions which satisfy these five conditions would assuredly be “pursued primarily with humanitarian intent” while also safeguarding that ” instances of protection induced regime change remain, as they have to date, rare and exceptional.”

Photo: uq.edu.au

By MARISSA GOLDFADEN

Last week, Kai Brand-Jacobsen (pictured here), director of the Department of Peace Operations at the Peace Action Training and Research Institute of Romania (PATRIR), gave a presentation titled Preventing War, Violence and Genocide: Critical New Approaches to Making Prevention Work. The event was jointly organized by Global Action to Prevent War and Armed Conflict, the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (UNDP), the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung New York, the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Conflict Issues of the British Parliament, and PATRIR’s Department of Peace Operations.

Brief introductory remarks were given by Dr. Robert Zuber, Chetan Kumar, and Volker Lehmann. The three spoke of the need for women, indigenous peoples, and other marginalized groups to be included in the capacity for prevention. They emphasized that we need to be attentive to smoke so as to not have to put out as many fires. They went on to discuss how conflict and intervention have changed as a result of boundaries and borders, climate changes, and rapid change. Rapid change requires rapid response, not allowing time for discussion, which can in turn lead to further conflict. Therefore there need to be standing structures and institutions—traditional (such as parliaments and police forces), those designated to manage conflict, such as the Ghana National Peace Council, and those at the national or local level. Inclusive participatory planning is a key aspect of prevention and moving beyond the short term, from intervention to accompaniment.

Brand-Jacobsen opened his presentation by using statistics to discuss why prevention matters. Over the last 40 years, there has been a “decrease” in war but a 45 percent increase in violence—more than 4,000 people per day die as a result of it, over 90 percent of whom live in low- and middle-income countries. Of those 4,000, approximately 2,300 commit suicide and 1,500 die due to injuries inflicted by someone else. Between 1990 and 2005, armed conflicts in Africa cost $284 billion. 740,000 people die every year as a result of armed violence, the majority occurring outside war zones. The average cost of a civil war is $65 to 125 billion and the global cost of homicides is $95 to 160 billion. Africa loses $18 billion per year due to wars, civil wars, and insurgencies.

Armed violence is defined as the intentional, threatened, or actual use of arms to inflict death or injury, and can occur within the contexts of both war and non-war. Armed violence during war can lead to genocide, mass atrocities, and the killing of civilians. But the impact of armed violence is greater than resultant armed conflict, as it also causes large-scale criminal activity, as well as inter-personal and gender-based violence. However, conflict should not be equated with violence, as the former can exist before and/or after the latter. In fact, global processes have made it so factors can be identified before a conflict becomes violent, namely conditions and structural factors for early warning.

The talk then segued into early warning and conflict intelligence. There are various conflict phases and intervention types and a crucial link between warning and response. Brand-Jacobsen stated that political will needs to be created, and emphasized training and learning, and integrated levels of conflict analysis—local, national, regional, and international/global. A key resource in this area is “Preventing Violence, War and State Collapse: The Future of Conflict Early Warning and Response.” Early warning systems should not stand alone, but be incorporated into existing systems.

The next section of the presentation focused on prevention, the “how” of which can be broken down into three categories: primary prevention, structural prevention (measures to ensure that crises do not arise in the first place or, if they do, that they do not recur), and operational prevention (measures applicable in the face of immediate crisis). The “when” is 1) always/standing and 2) operational, which includes the time not only before a crisis, but also during it. Ultimately, peacebuilding + peacemaking + peacebuilding = prevention. In order to develop an infrastructure for peace, reconciliation must be included under the heading of prevention to overcome entrenched ideologies and interests.

Photo: patrir.ro

From right: Eduardo Gonzalez, Esther Attear, Ana Manuela Ochoa Arrias

By MARISSA GOLDFADEN

Last week, as part of the eleventh session of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII), the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) organized a roundtable discussion on “Truth Commissions and Indigenous Peoples: Lessons Learned, Future Challenges.” The event also marked the launch of a resource book titled Strengthening Indigenous Rights Through Truth Commissions. Per the ICTJ, “The book summarizes the findings of an international conference on truth commissions and indigenous rights hosted by ICTJ in 2011. It makes concrete proposals to consider when setting up a truth commission focused on abuses committed against indigenous peoples.”

Moderating the discussion was Eduardo Gonzalez, director of the Truth and Memory Program at the ICTJ. Sparked by recent media coverage of the Canadian Indian residential school system, the ICTJ set out to determine whether truth commissions are useful for advancing the rights of indigenous peoples, particularly in Guatemala, Peru, and Paraguay. Today, there are truth commissions in Cote d’Ivoire, Nepal, and Brazil, as well as local efforts at truth-seeking taking place in Colombia, Mexico, and the United States.

The first speaker was Alcibiades Escué, coordinator of strategic planning at the Association of Indigenous Authorities of Northern Cauca. Mr. Escué said that from the 1980s through the present, the treatment of indigenous peoples is getting worse. He spoke of the extraction policies of the national government in indigenous territories occupied by guerrillas because of the mines located there. Territories have been consolidated and battalions camp out high in the mountains. There is an indigenous guard force consisting of young men and women who are oriented and accompanied by older people. Mr. Escué went on to speak about harmonic justice, the purpose of which is to promote self-determination for persons and communities so that they can best acquire life essentials. Within his community, this also includes searching for and registering victims. He concluded with talk of a house of thought, which not only provides training and education, but also aids in the reconstruction of historical memory. Another organizational process is the symbolic review of elders and spiritual authorities.

Next to speak was Ana Manuela Ochoa Arias, a lawyer for the National Authority of Indigenous Governments in Colombia. The indigenous peoples of Colombia live in the mountains of Santa Marta and comprise 30 percent of the Colombian population, which is about 1.3 million people. Sixty-five indigenous languages are spoken in the region, though Ms. Arias mentioned demographic fragility. Her speech focused on Law 1448, the Victims and Land Restitution Law, which was signed in June 2011 and pertains to historical reparations for the victims of the internal armed conflict that spanned 50 years. However, the law only applies to acts committed since January 1, 1985. So what is sought is transformational, rather than transitional, justice. Indigenous peoples have suffered cultural and economic damage, with specific damage caused to women and children. Ms. Arias maintains that the state has a legal obligation to such persons, each of whom individually had to make their own proposal.

The third speaker was Esther Attear, Passamaquoddy tribal member and lead staff person for the Maine Wabanaki-State Child Welfare Truth and Reconciliation Commission process. According to Ms. Attear, her people have witnessed a 95 percent decrease in population due to genocide, war, disease, and forced relocation. She discussed residential schools, where Indian children were sent after being taken away from their parents; the goal of such schools was to “kill the Indian, save the child.” It has now come to light that rampant abuse occurred in these schools, and approximately 1,000 children died as a result. The ultimate aim was the destruction of culture, including native dress and language. In 1978, Congress passed the Indian Child Welfare Act in response to “the alarmingly high number of Indian children being removed from their homes by both public and private agencies. The intent of Congress under ICWA was to ‘protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families’ (25 U.S.C. § 1902).” In Maine Wabanaki, state case workers received special training to deal with these cases, especially since in this culture, a child has three parents—mother, father, and tribe. Even so, there remained an invisible wall of the truth of genocide and genocidal policies. Decolonization also required truth and reconciliation; “white” people had to deal with their guilt and unpack a heritage of racism and genocide, while native people had to work through internalized oppression, lateral fighting, and a legacy of victimhood. In order to challenge the dominant narrative of white vs. native, both sides need to reach a common understanding, come up with recommendations for best practice, and share their stories in order to heal.

The last panelist was Alvaro Pop, Guatemalan independent expert and member of the UNPFII. He spoke about how in December 2011 in Colombia, indigenous people were victorious in having the Marmato municipal council “close the door to the efforts of Canadian companies to resettle the population and to destroy a town with 475 years of history in order to extract gold from the Marmato mountain using open pit mining in only 20 years.” He viewed this as an end of 400 years of darkness for the Mayas. He went on to say that indigenous peoples are survivors, having endured slavery, exploitation, and other such horrors. Now, the indigenous people want to rescue history, a mechanism to enrich identity, as the public school curriculum begins with colonization. A truth and reconciliation commission recognizes facts and awakens consciousness but was limited in Guatemala and didn’t have the future that was hoped for. It is now time to move beyond mourning and such a commission must contribute to the end of impunity by having specific mandates and including indigenous dialects and languages.

Mr. Gonzalez concluded the panel by talking about short- and long-term violations of rights—individual, collective, and earth. Reconciliation should not just be on an international level, but must be a nation-to-nation effort. He then opened up the floor for a brief Q&A session. The first person to speak was a professor at John Jay College of Criminal Justice who sat on the Guatemalan Commission from 1997 to 1999. She said they were dealing with 600 massacres and that there were actually two commissions, one from the Catholic Church and one from the UN. She believes that truth commissions are just the beginning and that there is a need for different sponsors.

Closing out the program was an audience member who is part of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, which is court-mandated and focuses on children who were forced to go to residential schools, as discussed above. This school system was in place for more than 150 years, and children spent anywhere from 10 to 21 years at these schools. There are 80,000 survivors, and the last residential school closed in 1996. Though the experience is sadly widespread, one survivor’s testimony states, “We have been raped in every way—emotionally, physically, spiritually, culturally.” The commission plans to establish a national research center and hold an expert group meeting before the end of 2013.

By MARISSA GOLDFADEN

The Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict recently published a policy brief titled “Operationalizing the Responsibility to Prevent.” What sets this paper apart from others of its ilk is the fact that it directly addresses the prevention aspects of R2P. Most importantly, the authors use what they refer to as a “crimes” approach to prevention. Within this framework exist three distinct dimensions involved in the commission of an atrocity crime: a perpetrator, a victim, and a permissive environment or situation. However, it is cautioned that one not be too rigid when labeling perpetrators and victims, as these identities can become fluid within a conflict situation.

The authors of the brief assert that, “Of the four R2P crimes . . . the legal category of crimes against humanity represents the best characterization of what the principle of R2P was designed to halt or address. [. . .] Research shows that crimes against humanity do not occur randomly, but often reflect a complex interaction of different actors over a long period of time.” The three stages during which conditions escalate to the level of mass atrocity crimes are 1) risk factors, 2) crisis & mobilization, and 3) imminent emergency. Systemic strategies, which are applied to the first stage, “seek to mitigate risk factors and build resilience in a broader group of states, which exhibit some of the so-called root causes of mass atrocity crimes.” In contrast, targeted strategies, which are necessitated by the second and third stages, “are designed to change either the incentives or situation of those contemplating or planning mass atrocity crimes, as well as the vulnerability of potential victims; they seek to shift the consequences of a potential course of action in a particular context.” (See page 9 for a table of targeted prevention tools.)

Lastly, when discussing mass atrocity prevention and the prevention of armed conflict, the paper makes two points: First, R2P crimes often occur in the context of violent conflict and second, “root causes” of genocide are similar to root causes of conflict. Yet it cannot be assumed that endeavoring to prevent, or even bring about an end to, conflict will necessarily reduce the potentiality of mass atrocity crimes. This is because

  1. While a large majority of mass killings since 1945 occurred within the context of armed conflict, at least a third of the cases did not.
  2. Some instances of mass atrocities occur under the “cover” of armed conflict, but are not directly linked to either the causes of that conflict or the conduct of the war itself.
  3. While strategies to prevent or resolve conflict tend to be aimed at eliminating or avoiding violence and the use of force, the prevention of mass atrocities—particularly at a late or imminent stage—may require military means.
  4. Armed conflict is regulated but not forbidden by international law, whereas mass atrocities are outlawed as crimes.

As such, it remains necessary to justify the need to act preventively and build generic capacity for prevention.

Image: migs.concordia.ca

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